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I. INTRODUCTION
In Torts as Wrongs, Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky discuss the connection between "tortious wrongdoing"
and "civil recourse."' Their civil recourse theory "sees tort law as a
means for empowering individuals to seek redress against those
who have wronged them."2 Goldberg and Zipursky show that
modern tort theory is dominated by "loss allocation," which uses
liability and damages as instruments for assigning losses to deter
unwanted behavior and to compensate the plaintiff.3 Under loss
allocation, the central principle of damages is full compensation-
that is, to make the plaintiff whole.4 The core component of
damages, though not the only one, is out-of-pocket expenses.
Under civil recourse, by contrast, the aim is to redress the wrong
through fair compensation, "requir[ing] of the fact-finder an
overtly normative determination based on consideration not only
of the losses suffered by the victim, but also of the character of the
defendant's conduct,. . . and the power dynamic between the
parties."5
This Article examines the implications of these distinctions
between loss allocation and civil recourse and between damages-
as-indemnification (i.e., full compensation) and damages-as-
redress (i.e., fair compensation) in the context of constitutional
torts. The distinctive feature of this type of litigation is that
plaintiffs typically seek retrospective relief rather than injunctions
or declaratory judgments aimed at ensuring future compliance
with constitutional norms.6 Typical fact patterns include false
I John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 919
(2010).
2 Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 1765,
1770 (2009).
3 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 920 (discussing the views of a variety of
scholars who "insist that concepts such as 'wrong,' 'legal wrong,' 'civil wrong,' and 'private
wrong' do no real work in explaining how the field hangs together, or what its point is").
These theorists believe that "tort law hangs together as law for the allocation of costs,
especially the costs of accidents." Id.
4 See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 435 (2006) (exploring modern torts scholars' views as to the purpose
of torts law).
5 Id. at 437.
6 For materials bearing on many aspects of constitutional tort litigation, see generally
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arrest,7 excessive force by the police,8 mistreatment of prisoners, 9
malicious prosecution,' 0 wrongful confinement," illegal searches
and seizures,12 retaliation for speech that displeases officials,13
arbitrary interference with property rights,14 dismissals from
government jobs without due process,15 and restrictions on the
speech of public employees16 and students. 7
Constitutional tort suits are brought against state officers and
local governments under 42 U.S.C. § 198318 and against federal
SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (3d ed. 2010).
7 See, e.g., Stearns v. Clarkson, 615 F.3d 1278, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the
plaintiffs claim that his constitutional rights were violated when he was arrested without
probable cause); Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) (analyzing the
plaintiff's claim that her arrest warrant contained false information).
8 See, e.g., McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing the
plaintiff's excessive force claim against police); Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 881-82
(8th Cir. 2010) (same).
9 See, e.g., Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 459 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's health is unconstitutional); Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144,
1150-56 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the constitutionality of the plaintiff's treatment).
10 See, e.g., Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010) (outlining
the elements of a malicious prosecution claim).
11 See, e.g., Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that
the plaintiff was unnecessarily detained when police prevented him from paying bond);
Gipson v. Jefferson Cnty. Sheriffs Office, 613 F.3d 1054, 1055 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing
wrongful imprisonment claim for not releasing plaintiffs after serving their sentences),
vacated, 649 F.3d 1274 (2011).
12 See, e.g., Mink v. Knox, 613 F.3d 995, 1003 (10th Cir. 2010) (alleging that search was
illegal because officers used an invalid warrant).
13 See, e.g., Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 280-81 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing the
plaintiffs allegations).
14 See, e.g., MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of Southern Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 281 (4th Cir. 2008)
(detailing when interference with property interests constitutes a violation of due process).
15 See, e.g., Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2010) (alleging due process
violation in a school investigation of a sexual relationship between a student and teacher).
16 See, e.g., Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding
a police officer's complaints about his partner and supervisor were not protected by the
First Amendment).
17 See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 251-52 (3d
Cir. 2010) (discussing whether a student's First Amendment rights were violated when he
was punished for making a fake internet profile of his principal).
1o The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
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officers under the implied cause of action recognized in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.19 The
leading cases on damages for constitutional torts are Carey v.
Piphus 20 and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura.21
In these cases, the Court adopted the damages-as-indemnification
approach favored by modern tort theory, holding that plaintiffs'
recovery is governed by the "compensation principle,"22 which
authorizes recovery of "damages grounded in determinations of
plaintiffs' actual losses." 23 According to the Court, the dual aims of
damages awards are to make the plaintiff whole and to deter
constitutional violations.24
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest the need for a
compelling alternative to the loss allocation model, however, as the
Court's conservative wing seems to be increasingly skeptical of the
general value of constitutional torts. Ashcroft v. Iqbal25 and other
recent cases have limited the availability of constitutional tort
suits against federal defendants. 26  Justice Scalia has called
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The leading case construing this statute as generally authorizing a
retrospective remedy for constitutional violations is Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183
(1961) (construing "under color of' to allow a federal remedy even if a state remedy is
available).
15 403 U.S. 388, 391-92 (1971) (explaining how an implied cause of action exists for
Fourth Amendment violations committed by federal officers regardless of whether state law
would punish a private citizen for the same conduct). For more discussion about Bivens and
its underpinnings, see Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1564 (1972) (arguing that the Court should be able to create
constitutionally based remedies the same way it does in the federal statutory context).
20 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978) (finding that "the rules governing compensation for
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests
protected by the particular right in question").
21 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (finding jury instructions allowing for an abstract valuation of
a constitutional right inconsistent with Carey).
22 Carey, 435 U.S. at 255.
23 Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307.
24 Id. at 306-07.
25 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
26 See, e.g., id. at 1948-49 (rejecting "supervisory liability" absent a constitutional
violation by the supervisor); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007) (rejecting Bivens
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outright for not extending the Bivens doctrine,27 and in Iqbal, the
majority of a sharply divided Court hinted that Bivens may see no
further growth. 28 Other recent rulings have raised more and more
obstacles to § 1983 liability.29  If this Article is right in
maintaining that modern negligence theory, with its focus on loss
allocation 30 is not a particularly apt source of principles for
constitutional torts, a strong case exists for considering other
approaches. Justices across the ideological spectrum may have
greater confidence in a normative theory like civil recourse that
gives vindication of rights priority over the allocation of losses.
At the very least, the civil recourse approach stands in contrast
to the loss allocation approach, thus offering a fresh perspective
worthy of attention. This Article hopes to show that examining
constitutional tort doctrine from the perspective of civil recourse
enhances one's understanding of what is at stake in these cases
and provides a new set of standards for evaluating the Court's
work. Over a broad range of issues, a civil recourse approach
holds the promise of shifting the terms of the debate in such a way
that a stronger showing is needed to justify rules that foreclose
plaintiffs from obtaining vindication of their rights, even if that
vindication takes only the form of nominal damages.
cause of action for land use dispute); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001)
(rejecting Bivens cause of action for acts of employee at a privately run federal prison);
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (rejecting Bivens cause of action against a federal
agency).
27 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting, in an opinion
joined by Justice Thomas, that he "would limit Bivens and its two follow-on cases
[recognizing an implied cause of action] to the precise circumstances that they involved"
(citations omitted)).
28 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (declaring that "implied causes of action are disfavored" and noting
the "limited" circumstances in which Bivens claims are available).
29 See, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1674 (2010) (limiting enhanced fee
awards to "rare" cases involving successful plaintiffs' attorneys); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,
555 U.S. 335, 349 (2009) (extending absolute prosecutorial immunity to managerial
decisions); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241-42 (2009) (permitting lower courts to
dismiss on immunity grounds without first reaching the merits of the claim); Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 (2004) (upholding defendant's qualified immunity claim).
Substantive constitutional holdings also have limited the plaintiffs opportunities to prevail.
See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 609 (2008) (limiting equal protection
"class-of-one" theory of recovery); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005)
(rejecting plaintiffs claimed "property" interest in enforcement of a restraining order).
3o See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
1008 [Vol. 46:1003
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Part II of this Article distinguishes the civil recourse approach
to constitutional torts from the Court's focus on compensation and
deterrence and shows that civil recourse is a plausible alternative.
Part III identifies the sharpest and most consequential difference
between these two approaches-namely, their distinctive means of
calculating damages; in particular, while the Court's loss
allocation approach to damages aims to make the plaintiff whole,
the civil recourse approach focuses on providing appropriate
redress. Part IV explores the implications of moving from the
"make the plaintiff whole" principle to "damages-as-redress" across
a range of remedial issues, including presumed damages, punitive
damages, and nominal damages. Part V identifies ways in which
conceiving of damages as a means of redress, rather than as a
means of indemnification, may enable plaintiffs to vindicate
constitutional rights that now go entirely unremedied due to
official immunity defenses. Part VI discusses important issues
related to the recovery of attorney's fees awards in constitutional
tort cases under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976.31 Finally, Part VII identifies, and counters, two major
objections to importing civil recourse theory into constitutional
torts law.
II. CIVIL RECOURSE
While much of modern tort law is concerned with the allocation
of losses, the civil recourse principle holds that the point of tort
law should be to empower the plaintiff to exact redress for
wrongs.32 Rather than seeking to promote social welfare by
compensating persons for losses or deterring misconduct, civil
a1 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
32 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 5 (1998); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 606 (2005)
("Government, by taking on the task of maintaining civil society, obtains from individuals a
variety of powers that they would otherwise be entitled to exercise. ... With resort to self-
help blocked by the law, government is obligated, at least to some degree, to provide an
alternative path for the attainment of satisfaction."); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at
918 ("As its name indicates, tort law is about wrongs. The law of torts is a law of wrongs
and recourse-what Blackstone called 'private wrongs."' (emphasis omitted) (internal
citations omitted)).
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recourse theory puts individuals and the rights they hold and
wrongs they commit at the core of the case.33 Torts are wrongs
done by the defendant to the plaintiff.34  Absent the state,
plaintiffs would be entitled to take matters into their own hands
and exact retribution from the wrongdoer. In lieu of self-help, the
state provides the tort remedy as the recourse for vindicating
rights.35 As Zipursky explains in his first article on civil recourse:
In a civilized society, we are not permitted to "get
even"-we are entitled to a private right of action in
place of getting even... . A private right of action
against another person is essentially a response to
having been legally wronged by that person, and
therefore exists only where the defendant has
committed a legal wrong against the plaintiff and thus
violated her legal right.36
Goldberg and Zipursky characterize civil recourse as an
"interpretive" theory of ordinary tort law.37 To the extent this
theory claims to describe tort law, it has encountered some
skepticism.38 Nevertheless, civil recourse theory may describe
some aspects of tort law better than its rivals, even if falling short
in other areas. For example, even its leading proponents
acknowledge that civil recourse theory does not account for key
33 See Zipursky, supra note 32, at 4 ("[Tort law is built around certain conceptions of
wrongs,'"rights,' and 'rights of action.' ").
4 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 918 ("The law of torts is a law of wrongs and
recourse.. . ."); see also Zipursky, supra note 32, at 87 (describing tort law as designating a
set of wrongs). Moreover, a tort is a relational wrong. Taking its cue from Judge Cardozo's
opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), civil recourse holds
that "[a] plaintiff may not recover unless the defendant's conduct was wrong relative to
her." Zipursky, supra note 32, at 87. This is the principle of "substantive standing." Id.
35 See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 32, at 5 (explaining the purpose for a private right of
action).
36 Id.
37 Solomon, supra note 2, at 1779 & n.76.
38 See Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky's Civil Recourse Theory, 75
FORDHAM L. REv. 1529, 1530-31, 1532 (2006) (arguing that certain aspects of civil recourse
theory do not necessarily describe tort law, charging that "its descriptive claims are
problematic," and suggesting that the project is better understood as "a normative one").
[Vol. 46:10031010
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features of negligence, "a tort for which loss is a component."39 On
the other hand, civil recourse may be "more consistent with the
structure of tort law than corrective justice or economic
accounts,"40 because it explains why "individual victims decide
whether to bring lawsuits against their injurers."41
A. CIVIL RECOURSE NORMS
While tort theorists focus their attention on Goldberg and
Zipursky's interpretive claims, the strength of their thesis does not
matter for purposes of this Article. The interest of this Article lies
elsewhere, in the normative implications of civil recourse theory
for the selection of specific rules of constitutional tort law. This
Article treats civil recourse as a source of norms for resolving
constitutional tort issues and argues that those norms compel
modification of many of the common law rules the Court has
chosen to borrow for constitutional tort law. These norms include:
(a) at least some violations of constitutional rights are
constitutional wrongs; (b) the victim of a constitutional wrong is
entitled to recourse; (c) the proper target of recourse is the
wrongdoer; (d) the central point of constitutional tort law is to
empower the plaintiff to obtain recourse by means of a private
cause of action; (e) redress should be available whether the
plaintiff can prove physical or emotional harm; and (f) redress
should take account of the intangible nature of constitutional
rights and wrongs.
The case for adopting civil recourse norms for general and
constitutional tort law begins from the premise that the state
provides tort law as the means for vindicating our rights against
those who have wronged us. Tort litigation replaces self-help by
affording plaintiffs an opportunity to vindicate their rights
through the courts. 42 Drawing on "the linkage of tort law to
3 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 955.
40 Solomon, supra note 2, at 1776.
41 Id.
42 See Zipursky, supra note 32, at 5 (" shall argue that our institution of private rights of
action embodies a 'principle of civil recourse.' According to this principle, an individual is
entitled to an avenue of civil recourse-ar redress-against one who has committed a legal
wrong against her.").
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individual rights [that] goes back at least to Locke," Goldberg
maintains that "[g]overnment, by taking on the task of
maintaining civil society, obtains from individuals a variety of
powers that they would otherwise be entitled to exercise,"43
including self-help.44 Having "relinquishe[d] the raw liberty to
respond aggressively to having been wronged[, the individual]
receives in return a certain level of security. . ., plus the assurance
that a civil avenue of redress against wrongdoers will be
supplied."4 5 The state makes "a political commitment" to an
alternative means of obtaining redress to victims of misdeeds, by
"empowering them to act against others who have wronged
them."46
B. CIVIL RECOURSE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS
The force of the argument for civil recourse norms is magnified
in the constitutional tort context because the rights asserted are
more vital and the defendants from whom redress is sought are
more powerful and more dangerous. The wrongs for which redress
is sought in constitutional torts are violations of the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment.47  These are fundamental
protections against government, adopted for the purpose of
protecting persons against abuse of power.48 The defendants are
4 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 606.
44 Id.; see also Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 973 ('[S]elf-help is for the most part
forbidden by the modern state.").
4 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 974.
46 Id. Professor Jason Solomon is concerned that Goldberg and Zipursky "have thus far
stopped short of providing a robust normative justification" for civil recourse and
undertakes to correct that deficiency. Solomon, supra note 2, at 1770; see id. at 1785
("'[A]cting against' another in response to wrongdoing is a distinctive form of 'moral
address,' and one which is particularly salient in a society based on liberal individualism,
like ours."); id. at 1798 ("[A] legal system that provides a state-created mechanism for
individuals to obtain redress of wrongs is itself normatively attractive and politically
justified.").
4 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (quoting Congress's declaration of the
purpose of the legislation).
48 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) ("Like
its counterpart in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to prevent government 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it
as an instrument of oppression."' (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)
(alteration in original))).
1012 [Vol. 46:1003
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themselves officers of the state. Because the rights are
fundamental and the wrongdoers exercise the formidable power of
the state, there is an especially strong case for recognizing an
obligation on the state's part to provide a tort remedy that
empowers victims to obtain redress. Thus, even if the state's
political commitment to provide a tort remedy against private
actors may not have the force Goldberg and Zipursky claim for it
in ordinary tort law, it may provide guidance for constitutional
torts.49
Conversely, the case for a loss-allocation approach is arguably
weaker in constitutional tort than in ordinary tort law. The social
problem addressed by loss allocation is personal injury and the
severe dislocations it causes for victims who face crushing medical
expenses, lose their jobs, and may be permanently physically
disabled or emotionally shattered.s0 The specific context may be
car accidents, product defects, workplace injuries, or mass torts.
Across a broad range of personal injuries, there are good reasons
to assign a high priority to allocating losses so as to minimize the
costs of accidents by imposing liability on actors who can prevent
them from occurring and by compensating the victims. Identifying
rights and wrongs, and authorizing recourse to redress those
wrongs, may have to give way to these goals.
Loss allocation may carry less weight in constitutional tort
because rights and wrongs are built into the prima facie case.
Constitutional tort plaintiffs must establish a violation of their
constitutional rights to win. And that violation is generally rooted
in an intangible injury, which only may be accompanied by
medical expenses, lost income, or some other out-of-pocket loss, or
emotional distress.5 1  Accordingly, many constitutional tort
plaintiffs receive only nominal damages. 52
49 See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1779-84 (discussing criticisms of Goldberg and
Zipursky's civil recourse theory).
so 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 3-11 (1991);
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970).
51 See Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68
MISS. L.J. 157, 215 (1998) ("Constitutional tort is unlike common law tort in that physical
injuries, while by no means unknown, are not a typical consequence of most constitutional
violations." (citation omitted)).
52 See, e.g., Frizzell v. Szabo, 647 F.3d 698, 700-02 (7th Cir. 2011) (approving an award of
only nominal damages in an excessive force case although plaintiff's evidence showed that
HeinOnline  -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 1013 2011-2012
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III. FROM MAKING THE PLAINTIFF WHOLE TO REDRESSING THE
WRONG
A distinctive feature of constitutional tort suits is that the
plaintiff sues for an injury that occurred in the past and seeks
damages as a remedy.53 Carey v. Piphus54 is the Court's leading
constitutional tort case on damages. The plaintiffs were public
school students who had been suspended for misbehavior without
receiving an adequate due process hearing.55 The issue before the
Court was whether they could obtain significant damages for that
procedural due process violation even if the facts were clear and
the rules were settled, so that they would have been suspended
from school in any event.56 The students conceded that in such a
case no damages could be awarded "to compensate them for
injuries caused by the suspensions."57 Nonetheless, they sought
damages for "the injury which is inherent in the nature of the
wrong," whether they could "prove that the denial of procedural
the officer had tased him multiple times, used pepper spray, and jumped up and down on
his chest); Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming that, were the
plaintiff to win on the merits, "as a former prisoner alleging a constitutional violation that
occurred during his incarceration, [the plaintiff] may obtain nominal and punitive damages
under § 1983"); Guy v. City of San Diego, 608 F.3d 582, 587-88 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming a
nominal damages award for excessive force by the police); Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson
Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[N]ominal damages must be awarded
when a plaintiff establishes a violation of the right to free speech."); see also NAHMOD ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 555 (collecting cases); James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity
Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1622
& nn.100-02 (2011) (collecting cases in which plaintiff received nominal damages).
53 See NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 1. Today, litigants seeking injunctive relief for
state officials' ongoing or threatened violations of federal law typically sue under § 1983.
But suits for prospective relief were brought long before Monroe under a well-established
cause of action for injunctive relief. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1081 (5th ed. 2003) ("[M]any
suits that might have been brought under § 1983 as interpreted by Monroe were treated
instead as actions for a remedy (usually an injunction) implied directly under the
Constitution.").
- 435 U.S. 247 (1978). For an examination of Carey, see generally Jean C. Love,
Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1242 (1979);
see also Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v.
Piphus, 93 HARV. L. REV. 966-67 (1980) (outlining models for awarding damages after
Carey v. Piphus).
s5 Carey, 435 U.S. at 250-51.
56 Id. at 266-67.
57 Id. at 260.
1014
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due process actually caused them some real, if intangible,
injury."58 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' theory, and instead
adopted the rules governing damages in ordinary tort law.5 9
A. MAKING THE PLAINTIFF WHOLE: THE "COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE"
On the broad issue of how damages should be awarded in
constitutional tort cases, Carey cited the Harper and James
treatise on torts for the proposition that "[tihe cardinal principle of
damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the
injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty."6 0 In the
common law, the main policy justifying the compensation principle
is that, as a matter of corrective justice between the parties,
defendants must make the plaintiffs whole for the harms they
have unjustly inflicted. 61 Taking this common law indemnification
principle as its guide, the Court ruled that "the basic purpose of a
§ 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights."62
Accordingly, the Court required that the plaintiff prove actual
harm to obtain compensatory damages for a procedural due
process violation. 63 Following this "principle of compensation,"64
lower courts have awarded constitutional tort plaintiffs the full
range of damages available in ordinary tort suits, so long as the
plaintiff can prove them.65
58 Id. at 260-61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
59 Id. at 262-64.
6 Id. at 254-55 (citation omitted).
61 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FoRMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14-15 (3d ed. 2007);
MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 74 (2008).
62 Id. at 254.
63 Id. at 262. The Court adopted the defendants' position that plaintiffs "should be put to
their proof on the issue, as plaintiffs are in most tort actions." Id.
64 Id. at 257.
65 According to one court, the "analysis of whether [the plaintiff] suffered an actual injury
warranting compensatory damages ... appears to be the same under both § 1983 and [state
tort law]." Randall v. Prince George's Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 208 (4th Cir. 2002). For recent
cases illustrating the range of damages that may be recovered in constitutional tort cases,
see Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Department, 604 F.3d 293, 311, 313 (7th Cir. 2009)
(upholding $4,000,000 award), and Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 845 (7th Cir. 2010)
(upholding $2.7 million award for loss of consortium).
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Carey left room for argument that its proof-of-damages
requirement only would apply to procedural due process cases,
where plaintiffs may not recover for substantive deprivations
despite a flaw in the process by which they were imparted. But a
few years later, in Memphis Community School District v.
Stachura,66 the Court extended Carey's proof-of-damages rule to
First Amendment cases and indicated that indemnification
principles would apply across the whole range of constitutional
torts.6 7 Stachura was a public school teacher who claimed to have
been punished on account of protected speech. 68 In fact, he had
been notified that he was suspended with pay during an
"administration evaluation" of his teaching, which never took
place.69 After filing his § 1983 suit, he was reinstated. 70 He
pursued the litigation anyway, won on the merits, and obtained a
jury verdict for $275,000 in compensatory damages and $46,000 in
punitive damages.7' The trial judge had instructed the jury, in the
Court's paraphrase, that they could award damages "based on the
value or importance of the constitutional rights that were
violated."72 Following Carey's compensation principle, the Court
held that the trial judge's instruction could not "be
squared ... with the principles of tort damages on which Carey
and § 1983 are grounded."73 Responding to efforts to distinguish
Carey as a procedural due process case, the Court said that Carey
"does not establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights,
with substantive rights afforded greater protection than 'mere'
6 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
67 Id. at 308-10.
8 Id. at 300-02.
69 Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7o Id.
71 Id. at 303.
72 Id. at 302. The Court specifically disapproved of the following language in the
instruction:
The precise value you place upon any Constitutional right which you find
was denied to Plaintiff is within your discretion. You may wish to consider
the importance of the right in our system of government, the role which
this right has played in the history of our republic, [and] the significance of
the right in the context of the activities which the Plaintiff was engaged in
at the time of the violation of the right.
Id. at 303.
73 Id. at 308.
[Vol. 46:10031016
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procedural safeguards."74  Given the compensation principle
announced in Carey, there is "simply ... no room for
noncompensatory damages measured by the jury's perception of
the abstract 'importance' of a constitutional right."75
Carey did acknowledge that modifications of the common law
rules of damages may be necessary at times because "the interests
protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be
protected by an analogous branch of the common law of torts."7 6
When such disconnects occur, "the task will be the more difficult
one of adapting common-law rules of damages to provide fair
compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a
constitutional right."77 In the years since Carey and Stachura,
however, the Court never has elaborated on these enticing
qualifications.
B. FULL COMPENSATION VS. FAIR COMPENSATION
In a significant group of cases, the modern common law
approach to damages stands at odds with the civil recourse
principle-that tort law is best seen as a state-provided means for
injured persons to redress wrongs done to them. There is no
conflict in cases in which the injury easily can be measured in
money, such as the value of a piece of property or a bill for medical
expenses. In such a case, the principle of compensation dovetails
with redressing the wrong. In other cases, however-and
particularly constitutional tort cases-the defendant produces a
more intangible injury, such as pain, suffering, or humiliation. In
these cases, the notion that damages exist to make the plaintiff
whole may fail to capture the defendant's wrong or the plaintiffs
demand for redress. Goldberg makes the following distinction
between civil recourse and the "standard modern" torts damages
compensation principle:
74 Id. at 309.
75 Id. at 309-10.
76 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1977).
7 Id.; see also Stachura, 477 U.S. at 309 (acknowledging that Carey recognized that "the
elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages might vary depending on the interests
protected by the constitutional right at issue" (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
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[S]tandard renditions ... treat tort law as a means by
which a person who suffers a harm can have that
harm annulled, erased, or indemnified ....
... [T]ort as a law for the redress of
wrongs ... supports a conception of tort damages as
fair compensation[,] [which] . . . in turn requires of the
fact-finder an overtly normative determination based
on consideration not only of the losses suffered by the
victim, but also of the character of the defendant's
conduct, mitigating circumstances that do not rise to
the level of recognized defenses, and the power
dynamic between the parties.78
Even in ordinary tort law, the availability of damages for
emotional and other nonpecuniary harm may be seen as at odds
with the principle of indemnification because the money awarded
does not fully eliminate the distress. 79 What is more, the soft
character of emotional harm renders the hard recompense of cash
a clumsy and ill-fitting equivalent. Professor Louis Jaffe made
much the same point many years ago when he noted that "neither
past pain nor its compensation has any consistent economic
significance."80 Yet damages for intangible injuries remain well-
established and have withstood efforts to eliminate them.
Accordingly, the modern "make-whole" principle is better viewed
not as an end in itself but as a means toward fair compensation for
those kinds of harm.8'
78 Goldberg, supra note 4, at 436-37 (emphasis in original).
79 Thus, Goldberg and Zipursky distinguish between compensation for out-of-pocket losses
and compensation for "setbacks that cannot be rectified as such but the impact of which money
can help ameliorate." Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 961 (emphasis added).
s0 Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &
coNrEMP. PROBS. 219, 224 (1953).
81 See Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for
Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 372 (2006) (noting that there is a 'long-standing and
dynamic tradition of compensation for intangible loss" and that "compensation has never stood
as an end goal in itself of tort law"). In this passage Professor Robert Rabin uses the term
compensation in the "make-whole" sense, or what Goldberg calls "full compensation."
Goldberg, supra note 4, at 436-37; Rabin, supra, at 361 (indicating that he will "suggest
reservations about the 'make-whole' principle-the notion that tort compensation has
conventionally aspired to restore an injury victim to a pre-injury position').
[Vol. 46:10031018
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IV. DAMAGES-AS-REDRESS IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
The gap between damages-as-indemnification and damages-as-
redress is particularly wide in constitutional torts for a critical
reason: the injury consists of violation of a constitutional right
itself and so, at bottom, it is inevitably intangible. 82 Even when
losses are easily calculated-as when a government takes
property, when a police officer's excessive force results in hospital
bills, or when dismissal from a job leads to lost salary-the
monetary loss is merely a consequence of the constitutional wrong
and does not precisely correspond to the constitutional injury. In
many other cases, there may be no monetary loss, yet the
constitutional injury is manifest.83  Consider, for example, a
plaintiff who tried to exercise his free speech rights by parading in
the public streets but was denied by the police in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments," or the teacher in Stachura
who was suspended with pay and then returned to his post after
the school investigated his speech.85 Moreover, the constitutional
injury may be severe even where the out-of-pocket loss is not.
Plaintiffs suing the police that violate their free speech rights86
should in principle stand on equal footing with plaintiffs who can
prove substantial business losses on account of a police beating,87
even though, as a practical matter, the latter case probably will
result in a greater award.
Constitutional tort plaintiffs (and their lawyers) typically do try
to fit their cases into the traditional tort framework, so as to
82 See Rabin, supra note 81, at 371 (characterizing constitutional wrongs as a "tort-type
intangible loss").
8 See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFIcIAL WRONGS
116 (1983) (asserting that "[mlany constitutional ... rights ... cannot readily be converted
into monetary terms, and the nominal damages often awarded for their violation are
inadequate.").
84 See, e.g., Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1998)
(hearing a § 1983 claim regarding denial of a permit to hold a parade).
85 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 301 (1986).
86 See, e.g., Irish Lesbian & Gay Org., 143 F.3d at 649-51 (discussing various types of
injuries incurred by the plaintiff); see also Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752,
756, 762 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that students disciplined in violation of their First
Amendment rights for wearing black armbands were entitled to nominal damages).
87 See, e.g., Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 1996) (outlining the
"extensive evidence" of plaintiff's injuries).
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secure substantial damages, by seeking recovery for emotional
distress. And courts generally have accommodated them. Some
courts go so far as to permit juries to award substantial amounts
for emotional distress based on the plaintiffs testimony alone,
without medical evidence.88 Not surprisingly, some cases leave
little doubt that jurors may leverage their ability to award
emotional distress damages so as to craft an award for the
constitutional wrong itself, independent of emotional distress
evidence. For example, in Bogle v. McClure, librarians who had
been transferred to menial jobs without salary reductions sued for
race discrimination and won.89 Based solely on their accounts of
distress and its effect on their careers, they won $500,000 each for
emotional harm.90 In the absence of any expert testimony in
support of the plaintiffs' claims of harm,91 a more convincing
justification for the award may be the jury's assessment that the
award was necessary to redress the constitutional wrong.92
Using emotional distress as a surrogate for the intangible value
of the constitutional right may suffice in some cases, but it is
hardly an all-purpose solution to the problem of achieving fair
compensation for constitutional wrongs.93 A given jury may choose
a more direct route only to find its intention thwarted by a court
that insists on absolute fidelity to compensation-as-
indemnification. Consider Corpus v. Bennett, an excessive force
88 See, e.g., Akouri v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
principle but still denying plaintiff recovery of compensatory damages for emotional distress
because the plaintiff provided insufficient evidence); Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241,
1254 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[A] plaintiff's testimony, standing alone, can support an award of
compensatory damages for emotional distress based on a constitutional violation . . . ").
89 332 F.3d 1347, 1350, 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91
F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1996) (similarly upholding substantial awards of emotional distress
damages based on the plaintiffs' testimony).
90 Bogle, 332 F.3d at 1359.
91 Id.
92 In this regard it may be helpful to distinguish emotional distress from pain and
suffering, an area in which the plaintiffs testimony may well be the best evidence. See, e.g.,
Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that "it is understandable
that Hendrickson relied primarily on his own testimony to prove his pain and suffering").
9 As Daryl Levinson points out, under Carey and Stachura, "damages are available only
for tort-like harms" and thus "are not calibrated to the social costs of constitutional
violations." Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 372 (2000).
[Vol. 46:10031020
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case in which the jury sought to use the nominal damages category
as a means of awarding $75,000 for the intangible value of the
constitutional wrong despite finding no compensatory damages. 94
The jury was instructed to decide whether "the use of excessive
force by [the] defendant . .. [was] a direct cause of injuries to [the]
plaintiff."95 It answered "no."96 Then in response to a question
asking "what nominal sum of money will fairly and adequately
compensate plaintiff ... for the deprivation of his constitutional
rights," the jury "entered $75,000."97 The jury, however, left blank,
as it had been instructed to do, two other questions on the verdict
form, including a question on "past pain, disability and emotional
distress," "past medical expenses," and "past lost wages," and
another question on "future" harms.98 Reasoning that the jury had
found no "actual damages" and thus had ignored its instructions in
awarding more than one dollar, the instructed amount to award
for nominal damages, the court affirmed the district court's
reduction of the nominal damages to a dollar.99 A court more
sensitive to the intangible nature of constitutional rights and more
open to the civil recourse principle that the point of constitutional
tort law is to redress constitutional wrongs may have treated the
nominal award as the jury's estimation of Goldberg's "fair
compensation,"100 especially in light of the precise question the
jury was asked to answer: "[W]hat nominal sum of money will
fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff... for the deprivation
of his constitutional rights?" 01
A. PRESUMED DAMAGES
Applying civil recourse principles would avoid the indirect route
for redressing constitutional wrongs, possibly illustrated by the
court's ruling in Bogle and the jury's aborted effort in Corpus, in
9 430 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2005).
9 Id. at 914 n.2.
9 Id. at 915.
97 Id. at 916.
9 Id. at 915 n.3.
9 Id. at 916.
100 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
101 Corpus, 430 F.3d at 914 n.3.
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favor of a more straightforward one. Rather than cramming
constitutional injury into the emotional distress category of
damages, courts would instruct jurors to evaluate the constitutional
wrong in light of all circumstances about the incident giving rise to
the litigation and agree on an appropriate award of damages. In
Thompson v. Connick, for example, the plaintiff spent eighteen
years in prison on death row, "fourteen of which were in solitary
confinement" on account of prosecutorial misconduct.102 The jury
awarded, and the Fifth Circuit upheld, an award of $14 million
against the city of New Orleans for emotional distress. 03 No doubt
a part of this award can be based on emotional distress, but some of
it likely represents a backhanded way of recognizing the gravity of
the constitutional violation. 04 From a civil recourse perspective on
the other hand, one can directly defend the award as redress for the
especially serious constitutional wrong.
This modification of the common law principles of damages may
be achieved within the Carey/Stachura model by reviving Carey's
dictum that some cases will require courts to "adapt[ I common-
law rules of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries
caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right."05  In
undertaking that adaptation, another common law doctrine-
presumed damages-could prove helpful. Professor Jean Love
suggested as much some years ago, arguing that "although the
Court will not recognize presumed general damages for abstract
deprivations of constitutional rights, the Court might be willing to
allow the recovery of presumed general damages for certain
intangible injuries caused by violations of constitutional rights."06
102 553 F.3d 836, 842 (5th Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). The
Supreme Court ruled that the city could not be sued for lack of an "official government
policy," 131 S. Ct. at 1359, 1366.
103 Thompson, 553 F.3d at 866.
104 For a case that features a false conviction and a $14 million award, but no time spent
on death row, see White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 2010). The defendants
evidently did not challenge the $14 million verdict for excessiveness. Id.
105 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 309 (1986) (acknowledging Carey's recognition that "the elements
and prerequisites for recovery of damages might vary depending on the interests protected
by the constitutional right" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
'0 Jean C. Love, Presumed General Compensatory Damages in Constitutional Tort
Litigation: A Corrective Justice Perspective, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 67, 80 (1992).
1022 [Vol. 46:1003
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This Article argues that civil recourse theory provides support for
the distinction Love draws.
The presumed damages principle-which has moorings in the
common law of torts-allows the plaintiff to obtain substantial
damages without proving them if the injury is likely to have
occurred but also is hard to prove.107 For example, courts award
presumed damages in defamation law, an area in which the injury
may occur when people who read or hear the statements avoid
having any relations with the plaintiff. In such cases, the plaintiff
may have no idea who these people are.108 Courts also may award
presumed damages for dignitary torts, such as assault, battery,
and false imprisonment, all of which resemble constitutional tort
claims brought under the Fourth Amendment for illegal seizures
or excessive force. 09 Like the dignitary torts, a violation of one's
constitutional rights clearly wrongs the plaintiff, whether it
produces physical or emotional harm. Similar to defamation,
these torts may produce an injury hard to prove. There is,
however, a difference: unlike defamation, where the harm involves
the behavior of unknown third parties, here, the injury is
intangible. Under loss allocation theories of tort, that difference
may be significant because defamation does produce independently
identifiable losses (namely, to reputation), while these
constitutional torts may consist only of the violated constitutional
right itself. Under civil recourse theory, however, this difference
should not matter because the point of the plaintiff's suit is not to
recover for an identifiable loss, but to vindicate rights.
Consistent with its general loss allocation approach, the
Supreme Court has been wary about approving presumed
damages for constitutional torts.110  Carey v. Piphus denied
presumed damages for procedural due process violations."' The
107 2 DON B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 260 (2d ed. 1993).
10 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1985)
(explaining presumed damages in defamation law).
109 See DOBBS, supra note 107, at 335-36 (noting the resemblance between dignitary torts
and constitutional torts).
110 See Love, supra note 106, at 67 ("[The Court has circumscribed the types of fact
situations in which an award of presumed general damages would be appropriate [in
constitutional tort litigation].").
111 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978).
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Court noted that "it is not reasonable to assume that every
departure from procedural due process .. . inherently is as likely
to cause distress as the publication of defamation per se is to cause
injury to reputation and distress."112 In addition, in a case like
Carey, "whatever distress a person feels may be attributable to the
justified [substantive] deprivation rather than to deficiencies in
procedure."' In Stachura the Court specifically rejected a trial
judge's instructions that would have authorized the jury to award
damages for a First Amendment violation "based on the value or
importance of the constitutional rights that were violated."" 4 The
plaintiff tried to defend the instruction by arguing among other
things that it "authorized a form of 'presumed' damages-a
remedy that is both compensatory in nature and traditionally part
of the range of tort law remedies.""15 The Court responded that
presumed damages are appropriate only "[w]hen a plaintiff seeks
compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but
difficult to establish" because in such a case they may "roughly
approximate the harm that the plaintiff suffered."116  The
challenged instructions, however, "did not serve this purpose"
because they "called on the jury to measure damages based on a
subjective evaluation of the importance of particular constitutional
values."" 7 Because the jury's award was "wholly divorced from
any compensatory purpose, [it could not] be justified as presumed
damages.""18
In both Carey and Stachura, the Court rebuffed plaintiffs who
sought presumed damages for constitutional torts. Neither
decision, however, closes the door entirely on a properly presented
claim for presumed damages. Though constitutional tort plaintiffs
generally work within the Carey/Stachura framework, a few lower
courts have awarded presumed damages in the quarter century
since Stachura without attracting the Supreme Court's wrath.119
112 Id. at 263.
us Id.
114 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 302, 304 (1986).
115 Id. at 310.
116 Id. at 310-11.
117 Id.
us Id.
119 See, e.g., Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The law recognizes that
[Vol. 46:10031024
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And there are indeed viable grounds for carving out a role for
presumed damages despite the skepticism expressed in Carey and
Stachura. The Court in Carey stressed the distinction between the
procedural violation, for which damages were sought, and the
substantive deprivation, which may have been entirely justified.120
The absolute no presumed damages holding therefore may be
limited to procedural due process cases. Stachura does not
repudiate presumed damages per se, but it distinguishes such
damages, when properly understood, from the award in that case
for the "abstract value" of constitutional rights.121 In a lengthy
footnote, for example, the Court cited "a long line of
cases ... authorizing substantial money damages as compensation
for persons deprived of their right to vote."122 These cases, unlike
the disapproved jury instruction, "involve nothing more than an
award of presumed damages for a nonmonetary harm that cannot
easily be quantified."12 3
In Stachura's voting rights footnote, the Court's preoccupation
with the loss allocation approach to torts rears its head. After
recounting the old cases, the Court drives home its point by
remarking that "whatever the wisdom of these decisions in the
context of the changing scope of compensatory damages over the
course of this century, they do not support awards of
noncompensatory damages such as those authorized in this case."124
Statements like this illustrate the contribution that civil recourse
theory can make in shaping the future of constitutional tort law.
Civil recourse provides a coherent and attractive alternative to the
Court's practice of using the main trends of ordinary tort law as its
guide. In particular, civil recourse theory provides sturdy support
for the old presumed damages decisions. And at the least it argues
strongly against endorsing "the changing scope of compensatory
law-abiding citizens can sue and recover general (or presumed) damages for a Fourth
Amendment violation, even without proof of injury." (citing Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d 299,
301 (7th Cir. 1992))); see also NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 564 (providing other examples
of courts receptive to presumed damages in the Seventh, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits).
120 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978).
121 Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308.
122 Id. at 311 n.14.
124 Id.
124 Id. at 312 n. 14.
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damages over the course of [the twentieth] century" as a guideline
for resolving constitutional tort issues. 125
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In the common law, juries may award punitive damages in tort
cases for a number of reasons, including to fill gaps in
compensatory relief, avoid underdeterrence of tortious conduct,
"express[] the community's abhorrence at the defendant's
act, . .. [and] head off breaches of the peace by giving individuals
injured by relatively minor outrages a judicial remedy ....
Civil recourse theory boils these multifarious aims down to two
core purposes: one based on the public interest in "punish[ing] a
defendant who has acted egregiously," the other grounded in "our
legal system's recognition that the plaintiff has a right to be
punitive."'27 This Section will focus on the latter, private plaintiff-
centered rationale, as it alone is emblematic of a civil recourse
approach to constitutional torts.
A basic issue that arises in applying civil recourse principles to
constitutional torts is the proper standard for imposing punitive
damages. Smith v. Wade, the Court's leading case on this topic,
arose out of a prison guard's failure to protect an inmate from an
attack by another inmate, in violation of the plaintiffs Eighth
Amendment rights.128 Smith held that punitive damages could be
awarded not only "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be
motivated by evil motive or intent," as the defendant had
proposed, but also "when it involves reckless or callous indifference
to the federally protected rights of others."129 Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court justified this holding primarily by relying on
125 Id.
126 Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996).
127 Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 106 (2005).
Zipursky goes on to argue that "[finsofar as punitive damages are basically civil, and not
about criminal punishment, they do not merit the special constitutional scrutiny afforded to
criminal defendants." Id. at 107. The quasi-criminal aspect of punitive damages has no
special relevance to constitutional torts and will not be examined herein.
12 461 U.S. 30, 32 (1983).
129 Id. at 56.
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nineteenth and twentieth century tort law, without making any
explicit reference to underlying tort theory.130
From a civil recourse perspective, the issue raised by Smith
concerns the breadth of the plaintiff's right to be punitive. Civil
recourse theory holds that the state empowers the plaintiff to sue
to redress the wrong committed by the defendant.'13 In cases in
which the defendant has acted egregiously, the plaintiffs right to
redress should extend beyond compensatory damages. In other
words the greater the wrong, the greater the right of redress.
Thus, "[h]aving suffered this insult, the plaintiff is herself entitled
to redress at a different level."132 Zipursky explains:
The imposition of punitive damages reflects a
judgment that a private person is entitled, in light of
the wrong done to him or her, to act upon the
defendant in a manner that exceeds what is necessary
to restore her holdings-to be compensated for the
injury done. She is entitled to exact a punitive
sanction from the defendant in light of what he did to
her and how he did it.13
The Court in Smith v. Wade framed the issue before it as one of
determining what common law courts do. Had it applied civil
recourse theory, however, it would have asked whether the
plaintiff's right to punitive damages extends beyond cases of "evil
motive or intent," so as also to reach cases of "reckless or callous
indifference."134 The difference between the two approaches is
this: Smith applies the same rule across the whole range of
constitutional torts,135 whereas civil recourse permits a more
nuanced approach, perhaps allowing courts to choose different
rules depending on context. For example, because the plaintiff in
130 Id. at 38-55. Justice Rehnquist's dissent also focuses on the common law, especially
from the nineteenth century. Id. at 57-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
132 See Zipursky, supra note 127, at 151.
13s Id. at 154.
134 461 U.S. at 56.
135 See id. (specifying that its holding concerning punitive damages regards actions under
§ 1983).
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Smith was a prisoner, and thus wholly dependent on the
defendant for protection, the case for applying a broader punitive
damages rule gained strength. On the other hand, the Eleventh
Circuit, applying Smith, upheld a $14 million punitive award to
librarians who were transferred to menial jobs on account of their
race, in addition to the $500,000 each plaintiff received in
compensatory damages.136 Arguably, the standard for awarding
punitive damages should be more demanding when the plaintiff is
neither helpless nor the victim of physical harm--civil recourse
theory would support that doctrinal flexibility. 137
C. CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN BREACH AND INJURY
To obtain damages the constitutional tort plaintiff must prove
not only a constitutional violation and damages, but also a causal
link between the violation and the damages. 38 For example, a
plaintiff who establishes both a procedural due process violation
and an injury, like the plaintiff in Carey, will not necessarily
recover. The Carey Court "requir[ed] the plaintiff [to show] that
136 Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003).
'7 Besides Smith, the only other constitutional tort punitive damages case from the
Supreme Court is City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), in which the
Court held that municipal governments may not be held liable for punitive damages. Id. at
271. The Court relied partly on nineteenth century tort law and partly on policy
considerations. Id. at 259-66. Thus, one aim of punitive damages is retribution, but "[a]
municipality ... can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials." Id. at 267.
As for deterrence, "it is far from clear that municipal officials. . . would be deterred from
wrongdoing by the knowledge that large punitive awards could be assessed based on the
wealth of their municipality." Id. at 268. Under a civil recourse approach, by contrast,
neither the deterrence argument (whatever its validity) nor the common law background
would resolve the issue of municipal liability for punitive damages. The issue would turn
on whether the Court's assertion that "[a] municipality ... can have no malice independent
of the malice of its officials" is a convincing answer to the claim that city policy makers have
not only violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights, but have done so in pursuit of the city's
aims and have done so with an appropriately egregious state of mind. In a footnote, the
Court seemed to recognize this possibility. Id. at 267 n.29 ("It is perhaps possible to
imagine an extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating
an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights."). But neither the Court nor lower courts have
made use of this dictum in the thirty years since City of Newport.
'a See, e.g., Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (requiring a causal
connection between an officer's omission and subsequent injury). See generally Thomas A.
Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IowA L. REV. 443 (1982) (discussing a range of
causation issues).
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he actually suffered distress because of the denial of procedural
due process itself."139 By contrast, civil recourse theory would
authorize plaintiffs to recover at least nominal damages upon
proving violations of their constitutional rights even if they suffer
no harm. In what follows, one should bear in mind that the
argument for nominal damages in this context is wholly separate
from the argument advanced above for presumed damages.
Neither of them entails or negates the other.
1. Nominal Damages Absent Causation of Harm. Carey
recognized that recourse to the courts has some value even where
the plaintiff cannot prove actual damages. After requiring proof of
harm to obtain compensatory relief, the Court turned to the
problem of plaintiffs who could prove a constitutional violation but
show no damages.140 Looking to the common law for guidance,
Justice Powell noted that "[c]ommon-law courts traditionally have
vindicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are not
shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a
nominal sum of money."141 Thus, plaintiffs suing for such torts as
battery, assault, false imprisonment, and defamation may prevail
on the merits without proof of harm and obtain nominal damages,
typically one dollar. Building on this common law principle, Carey
held that nominal damages would be available for procedural due
process violations.142 Ever since Carey, nominal damages have
been routinely available for constitutional torts whether actual
harm is proven.143
139 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978) (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 266.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 266-67.
'14 See, e.g., Lowry ex. rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir.
2008) ("[N]ominal damages must be awarded when a plaintiff establishes a violation of the
right to free speech."); KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 F.3d. 1256, 1260-61 (11th
Cir. 2006) (holding that nominal damages are recoverable if the party establishes a
violation of constitutional rights); Schneider v. Cnty. of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784, 794-95
(9th Cir. 2002) (reprimanding district court for failing to award nominal damages on the
plaintiffs procedural due process claims).
The Court addressed a variation on this theme in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175
(2010) (per curiam). The Fourth Circuit had ruled that a prison inmate suing a guard for
beating him must "show[ ] ... significant injury in order to state an excessive force claim."
Id. at 1178. The Court reversed, holding that the Eighth Amendment violation turned on
"the nature of the force," not the extent of the harm inflicted. Id. at 1179. The brief per
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Having shown some appreciation for the value of vindicating
constitutional rights in its treatment of nominal damages, the
Court in Carey nonetheless took a wrong turn from the perspective
of civil recourse theory. In describing the rationale for nominal
damages, Justice Powell chose to minimize the value of
vindication:
By making the deprivation of such rights actionable
for nominal damages without proof of actual injury,
the law recognizes the importance to organized society
that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the
same time, it remains true to the principle that
substantial damages should be awarded only to
compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary
or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious
deprivations of rights.144
Applying this principle to constitutional torts, the plaintiff who
establishes a due process violation, but proves no harm, would be
entitled to nominal damages "not to exceed one dollar."145
Civil recourse theory would demand a reformulation of Carey's
rationale for nominal damages. Justice Powell's reasoning
undervalues vindication by treating it as a kind of public value
rather than a right held by the plaintiff. Justice Powell
"recognizes the importance to organized society that ... rights be
scrupulously observed," and the propriety of vindicating rights by
way of private suits for damages.146 The thrust of his conclusion,
however, is that any such vindication can and should be
subordinated to other considerations. According to civil recourse
curiam opinion treated the case as an occasion for correcting the Fourth Circuit's
misapplication of Eighth Amendment precedent. From a civil recourse perspective, the
outcome in Wilkins is correct because a wrong is sufficient to impose liability, even if no
compensable harm results.
144 Carey, 435 U.S. at 266.
14 Id. at 266-67. The continuing influence of this account of nominal damages can be
seen in Guy v. City of San Diego, 608 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2010) ("An award of nominal
damages is intended to serve as a symbol that defendant's conduct resulted in a technical,
as opposed to injurious, violation of plaintiff's rights." (quoting Cummings v. Connell, 402
F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
146 Carey, 435 U.S. at 266.
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theory, the whole point of the tort remedy is to provide plaintiffs
with access to the courts to obtain meaningful redress for the
violation of their rights, regardless of whether the plaintiff has
suffered compensable injury.147 There may be other means of
affirming the importance of rights to society at large, but their
availability is no answer to the plaintiffs argument for vindicating
the plaintiff's own rights.
2. Mixed Motives. There is a special causation rule for
situations in which the defendant acts with mixed motives, one of
them constitutionally suspect, in taking adverse action against the
plaintiff. In Mt. Healthy School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, a teacher charged that officials fired him on account of
protected speech. 4 8 A lower court had allowed him to win by
showing that the unconstitutional motive "played a substantial
part in the decision." 49 The Supreme Court took a different
approach, however, adopting a version of the general common law
"but-for" causation test for attaching liability to official decisions,
even those motivated in part by unconstitutional reasons.o50 Even
if plaintiffs show that their protected speech was a substantial
factor behind the adverse employment action, they would still lose
if the defendants can establish that they would have been fired for
other reasons in any event.' 5' Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Rehnquist explained that:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether
protected conduct played a part, "substantial" or
otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an
employee in a better position as a result of the exercise
of constitutionally protected conduct than he would
have occupied had he done nothing.152
To the extent constitutional torts are aimed at determining who
should bear a loss, this holding seems justified. Plaintiffs who
147 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
us 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1976).
149 Id. at 284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 Id. at 286-87.
15' Id. at 287.
152 Id. at 285.
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would have lost their job anyway should not get a windfall just
because one reason for the firing was unconstitutional. As with
general principles of damages, the Court's implicit premise seems
to be that constitutional tort law exists to allocate losses.153
Attentiveness to civil recourse theory, with its focus on redressing
private rights, may well have produced a different causation rule.
If one views the plaintiff in a case like Mt. Healthy as the target of
an unconstitutional motive-indeed a substantial one-perhaps
some remedy should be available, at least nominal damages. Even
if lost wages cannot be traced to the illicit motive, that motive
nonetheless figured in the constitutional violation. Yet under the
Court's test, the plaintiff must lose whenever the defendant can
satisfy the mixed-motive test.
Contrary to civil recourse theory, the Court in Mt. Healthy
seems to conflate the plaintiff's interest in compensatory damages
with the interest in vindicating rights, so that the former is the
measure of the latter. The Court put the point this way: "The
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if . .. an
employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not
engaged in the conduct."154 But, again, this line of reasoning has a
question-begging quality. To be sure, this assertion may offer an
adequate answer to the plaintiffs request for compensatory
damages. It does not, however, explain why nominal damages are
153 The Court's inability to perceive of a suit for retrospective relief as anything but an
effort to obtain compensatory damages is illustrated by Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 19-21
(1999) (per curiam), in which the Court ruled that an unsuccessful applicant challenging an
affirmative action program could not obtain any retrospective relief absent proof that he
would have been admitted, even though a similarly unsuccessful applicant would have
standing to seek prospective relief on the theory that he was entitled, as a matter of equal
protection, to be considered under constitutionally valid criteria. In some contexts,
however, the Court seems to take a different view. Cf. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175
(2010) (per curiam). Wilkins was a § 1983 damages suit brought by a prisoner, in which the
plaintiff charged excessive force by guards but did not "assert[] that his injuries had
required medical attention." Id. at 1177. The District Court dismissed the complaint for
failure to assert more than "a de minimus [sic] injury." Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted). The Supreme Court reversed. Id. In doing so, it reaffirmed the well-settled
Eighth Amendment principle that "[wihen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use
force to cause harm ... contemporary standards of decency always are violated ... whether
or not significant injury is evident." Id. at 1178 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86.
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unavailable when an unconstitutional reason at least contributed
to the adverse employment action. 55 Throwing the plaintiffs case
out of court does not put him "in no worse a position than if he had
not engaged in the conduct."15 6 Arguably, the plaintiff suffered a
wrong because of the bad motive and thus is entitled to recognition
of that wrong, at least through a public declaration of the
wrongdoing and a nominal damages award.
Taking a civil recourse approach does not necessarily dictate
recovery of even nominal damages for any plaintiff who can show
that an unconstitutional motive was a substantial factor in the
adverse action. The strength of the plaintiff's case, even when
seeking only nominal damages to vindicate one's own rights,
depends on how much the unconstitutional motive influenced the
outcome. Perhaps it should not be sufficient for the plaintiff to
show that the unconstitutional motive was a substantial factor.
Borrowing a test from the law of defamation, for example, the
Court might allow plaintiffs to recover nominal damages only upon
showing that the dominant purpose of the official who acted
against them was an unconstitutional one. 57 The dominant-
purpose test could replace the test entirely for mixed-motives
cases. 58 The argument advanced here is more modest. Under this
approach, Mt. Healthy would remain a bar to plaintiffs who seek
compensatory damages but who cannot survive the but-for test.
Plaintiffs, however, would be entitled to a jury instruction that
they win on the constitutional merits and are entitled to nominal
damages if the jury is persuaded that the defendant's dominant
purpose was to disadvantage them by denying their exercise of
constitutional rights.
1'6 For an argument that questions the Court's ruling without drawing the distinctions
made here between vindication and deterrence and between compensatory damages and
nominal damages, see Michael Wells, Three Arguments Against Mt. Healthy: Tort Theory,
Constitutional Torts, and Freedom of Speech, 51 MERCER L. REV. 583, 585-86 (2000)
(arguing for "a rule that allows the plaintiff to recover full damages whenever the
constitutional violation was sufficient to cause them").
156 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86.
167 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 cmt. A (1977) (defining how one may
abuse a qualified privilege depending on one's purpose in publishing defamatory matter).
us See Wells, supra note 155, at 589 (presenting the dominant-purpose test as an
alternative to the Mt. Healthy but-for test).
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V. REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION
Constitutional rights do not exist in a vacuum. They "are
dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real
world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence."159  A
remedial scheme might take as its goal to make the plaintiff whole
for violations of constitutional rights by compensating the plaintiff
who can establish a constitutional violation, causation, and
damages. Our system of constitutional remedies, however, has
never been so simple and so focused. The reality of constitutional
litigation is that other factors have considerable influence on
remedial doctrine. 160 Of particular significance, there always has
been significant resistance to the prospect that plaintiffs may
bring lawsuits against state officials and local governments under
federal law and recover substantial damages from those officials
for doing their jobs.161 The Court's response to those pressures has
been shaped by the loss allocation model and its indemnification
principle.162 Assuming that the aim of damages is to make the
plaintiff whole for the loss caused by any actionable violation, it is
awkward, if not impossible, to modulate recovery to reflect the
need to give officials some leeway-at least as much as the Court
has, often precluding all retrospective relief by recognizing an
official immunity defense or narrowly defining substantive
constitutional rights. Under a civil recourse approach, the Court
easily could adopt a more fine-tuned approach to remedial
equilibration. Damages-as-redress can be adjusted so as to allow
vindication of rights-either by redefining substantive rights or by
159 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 858 (1999). The concern here is with remedial equilibration in connection with
traditional backward-looking tort remedies. For a discussion of prospective remedies, see
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006) (discussing courts'
application of justiciability doctrines in the context of injunctive remedies).
160 See Fallon, supra note 159, at 637 (advancing the thesis "that courts, and especially
the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall
alignment of doctrines involving justiciability, substantive rights, and available remedies").
161 See, e.g., id. at 689 (noting the Rehnquist Court's expansion of state sovereignty and
official immunity doctrines).
162 See supra Part III.A.
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retooling official immunities-without fully indemnifying the
plaintiff.
A. LIMITS ON SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
In the past, the Supreme Court has sometimes responded to
concerns about expanding constitutional tort obligations by
declining to recognize a constitutional violation in the first place.
In Paul v. Davis163 and Siegert v. Gilley,'6 4 the Court turned away
plaintiffs who claimed that the defendants made defamatory
statements about them, causing demonstrable harm to their
reputations. Paul held that reputation, standing alone, is not part
of the "liberty" or "property" protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 In reaching this result, the
Court expressed its unwillingness to treat § 1983 as "a font of tort
law to be superimposed" on state protections.166 Siegert presented
an even more difficult problem for the Court because the complaint
alleged that the defendant acted "maliciously and in bad faith [in]
publishing a defamatory per se statement ... which [he] knew to
be untrue, or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or
not."167 Unmoved by these allegations, the Court simply relied on
its earlier ruling, pointing out that "[o]ur decision in Paul v. Davis
did not turn . .. on the state of mind of the defendant, but on the
lack of any constitutional protection for the interest in
reputation." 68
As a matter of constitutional principle, Paul and Siegert are
hard to swallow because they seem to permit state officers to
inflict serious harm based on utterly inexcusable motives without
any accountability to the injured person. 69 The explanation for
16 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
1- 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
165 See 424 U.S. at 710-12 (distinguishing cases in which the harm to reputation was
accompanied by denial of some other "right vouchsafed ... by the State").
166 Id. at 701.
167 500 U.S. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Id. at 234.
16 The lower courts have softened the impact of the cases, with the Supreme Court's
implicit approval or indifference, by permitting recovery under the "stigma-plus" doctrine.
To prevail, the plaintiff must show not only a stigma resulting from the defendant's actions,
but also some other deprivation, such as a job. See, e.g., Humphries v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
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Paul and Siegert seems to lie in a concern about unleashing a
torrent of litigation resulting in huge judgments for defamation by
officers, in which findings of malice may be dubious but hard for
appellate courts to overturn.o70 This account of Paul and Siegert
suggests that the Court started from the premise that allowing
plaintiffs to sue would necessarily result in damages awards
because some plaintiffs would be able to satisfy the remedial
requirements. That premise is a familiar one in common law
negligence, and it is taken for granted in any body of tort law with
allocation of losses as its aim. With loss allocation as integral to
its understanding of tort law, the Court may have perceived the
issue presented by these cases as binary: The plaintiff either
would be permitted to recover compensatory damages or denied all
relief on the merits. Given that stark choice, the Court opted for
the latter.'7 1
Starting from the premise that constitutional tort law is a
system of civil recourse may lead to a different outcome. Under
civil recourse principles, the aim of the litigation is redress, which
requires vindication of the plaintiffs rights but does not
necessarily demand full compensation.17 2 Redress is a much more
flexible aim than loss compensation. 7 3 In the common law
tradition, one either obtains compensation or one does not. The
only cases in which partial compensation is the norm is where the
plaintiff is at fault. Many injured persons, though, never obtain
554 F.3d 1170, 1188 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Paul provides that stigma-plus applies when a right or
status is 'altered or extinguished.'" (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976))); Velez
v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 90 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[Wje conclude that this combination of activities
implicated [plaintiffs] 'stigma-plus' liberty interest. . . ").
170 See Levinson, supra note 159, at 893 (noting that "the Court may have feared the
wholesale federalization of tort claims against state and local government officials").
171 This analysis puts aside the possibility, as it seems the Court did, of imposing a rule of
absolute immunity from defamation liability for all officials. Cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564, 574-76 (1959) (holding that policy making executive officials are absolutely immune
from liability for common law defamation).
172 See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1776-77 (noting this distinction between civil recourse
and corrective justice).
173 See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 962 ("The wrongful causing of a loss entails
relief in the form of loss shifting. By contrast, to understand a tort as a wrong that
generates a right of action in its victim leaves the issue of remedies open."); Zipursky, supra
note 32, at 88 (distinguishing "the question of whether a plaintiff has a right of action from
the question of what form of remedy is available to her if she does have a right of action").
1036 [Vol. 46:1003
HeinOnline  -- 46 Ga. L. Rev. 1036 2011-2012
20121 CIVIL RECOURSE AND CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 1037
complete redress against the wrongdoer, if only because the wrong
cannot be measured in money.174 Because redress is a matter of
degree, it can be compromised more readily than loss without
threatening the coherence of the remedial system.175 It would be
defensible under a civil recourse model, for example, to hold that
the consequence of establishing liability is not an award of
compensatory damages but a simple finding of liability combined
with nominal damages. In such a world, victims of defamation by
state officials might not be completely vindicated, but they would
be better off than under the current regime, in which they are left
with no recourse at all.
B. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Official immunity shields defendants from liability even when
they have violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights and caused
actual damages.176  This doctrine, deeply entrenched in the
common law,' 77 is rooted in the perceived need to avoid overly
deterring beneficial official acts. Without such protection, officers
would act too cautiously for fear of liability. 78 The premise is that
fear of liability affects official behavior, such that litigation risks
impose costs not only on innocent officials but on "society as a
174 See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 437-38 (contrasting "tort as a law for the redress of
wrongs, which in turn supports a conception of tort damages as fair compensation" with
"tort as a law of indemnification, which in turn supports a conception of tort damages as full
compensation, which requires the factfinder to set damages at an amount equal to the losses
suffered by the tort victim as a result of the tort").
175 Cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,
748-49 (2003) (separating the issue of whether a claimant is "entitled to an avenue of
recourse" against a defendant from the issue of the nature of the remedy to which the
plaintiff is entitled).
176 See, e.g., Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that if a jury
finds both that the plaintiff suffered damages and that the defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity, judgment must be entered in defendant's favor).
177 A classic formulation of official immunity, but by no means the earliest, is Judge
Learned Hand's in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580-82 (2d Cir. 1949) (justifying official
immunity by a public policy that favors leaving "unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest
officers" to "subject[ing] those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation").
178 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (cautioning that "the threat of liability
can create perverse incentives that operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of
their duties"); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (stating that "public officers
require this protection [of immunity] to shield them from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats and liability").
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whole," including "the expenses of litigation, the diversion of
official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
able citizens from acceptance of public office." 79 In addition, there
is concern that "fear of being sued will 'dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.' "180 The underlying problem
is that, unlike a private actor, the official cannot capture the
benefits of bold actions that risk harm to others.' 8 Absent a
shield from liability, officials may too often err on the side of stasis
and inaction.
Building on these premises, the Court has described its
immunity doctrine as embodying an effort to reach a proper
balance between the policies favoring immunity and the value of
providing a remedy for violations of constitutional rights.182 In
suits against officials exercising discretionary functions, the Court
has ruled that qualified immunity is "the best attainable
accommodation of competing values." 8 3 The rule is that such
officials "generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 84  Officials who exercise prosecutorial,
judicial, or legislative functions are entitled to absolute immunity,
which is available regardless of their motives.185 The rationale for
179 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
180 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949)).
181 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408-12 (1997) (analyzing whether
immunity should be extended to guards in a privately managed prison); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1337-38 (9th ed. 2008) (discussing "the implicit
asymmetry in the incentives imposed on public officials left wholly unprotected by any
immunity doctrine").
182 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14 ("The resolution of immunity questions inherently
requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative."); see also
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (discussing "the undeniable tension between
official immunities and the ideal of the rule of law").
18s Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814, 818.
14 Id. at 818.
185 See, e.g., Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 864-65 (2009) (upholding
prosecutorial immunity); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (endorsing
legislative immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (finding judicial
immunity). The Court has adopted what it calls a functional approach for deciding whether
an officer enjoys absolute immunity in a given case. See, e.g., Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230
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enhanced protection for these functions, though not fully
articulated in the opinions, is that the need to limit litigation is
especially strong in these contexts. In connection with judicial
immunity, for example, the Court worries that "[i]f judges were
personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche
of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide
powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely
to provoke such suits."186 When either qualified or absolute
immunity is available, the suit is dismissed and the plaintiff
recovers nothing.
1. Nominal Damages. The Court justifies immunity as an
accommodation between the social value in compensating the
plaintiff and deterring constitutional violations, on the one hand,
and the social need to avoid overdeterrence of bold and effective
official action, on the other.'87 Current doctrine provides that an
official who successfully asserts immunity is entitled to dismissal
of the suit. Thus, even nominal damages are not available.
Indeed, if the whole point of damages is to make the plaintiff
whole, nothing more remains at stake in the litigation once that
objective is foreclosed by immunity.
Adopting the damages-as-redress principle would provide
grounds for a different approach because recovery of compensatory
damages no longer would be the sole point of the litigation.
According to this principle, vindication of the plaintiff's rights is a
separate and independent value. 88 Thus, one may distinguish, as
the Court does not, between (a) protecting the defendant from the
threat of liability for damages and (b) protecting from a judgment
that the defendant violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights. 89
(holding that a judge is not shielded by absolute immunity for personnel decisions).
186 Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27. Note, however, that absolute judicial immunity only
extends to "judicial acts." Id. at 230. Forrester itself held that judges enjoy no absolute
immunity for their decisions on hiring and firing court employees. Id.
187 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (exploring the policy concerns of governmental
immunities).
188 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
189 In Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011), the Court took a potentially significant
step toward recognizing this distinction. The Ninth Circuit had ruled against the officials
on the constitutional issue but had awarded them qualified immunity. Id. at 2027. The
officials sought Supreme Court review of the ruling on the merits. Id. at 2028. One of the
obstacles they faced was establishing Article III standing, which required them to show that
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The avoiding overdeterrence rationale may justify immunity from
damages without necessarily justifying immunity from liability.
By conflating the two issues-liability and damages-the Court
seems to indicate an indifference to vindication as an independent
value, separate from compensation for loss. The Court's
unarticulated premise seems to be that the only important issue is
who should bear the loss and that, having decided that the
plaintiff should do so, its work is done. The Court does not cite
Carey's dismissive treatment of vindication, but the attitude
manifested in Carey looms in the background.190
Under the civil recourse damages-as-redress principle, the
plaintiff's interest in vindication could be satisfied by allowing
even a nominal damages award.191 The case for nominal damages
is not necessarily compelling, as the need to avoid overdeterrence
may remain. Yet, it is surely weaker because that need may be
adequately satisfied by disallowing substantial damages awards.
Officials who know that they may be held liable for one dollar may
be pushed to some degree toward caution but not nearly so much
as those who know that substantial damages may be awarded
against them. Officials, after all, already are vulnerable to
injunctive relief for all constitutional violations,192 and the Court
has never considered the overdeterrence problem to be serious
enough to foreclose such prospective relief. Given the ready
availability of prospective relief, it seems implausible that the
threat of nominal damages adds any force to the case for
they "suffered an injury in fact." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Despite their victory below, the Court ruled that they had standing to do so. Id. For one,
the constitutional ruling "may have prospective effect on the parties," because an "official
[who] regularly engages in [the challenged] conduct . .. must either change the way he
performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action." Id. at 2029. Similarly, if the
plaintiff "may again be subject to the challenged conduct, she has a stake in preserving the
court's holding." Id. For present purposes, the key point is that the ruling on the merits
has independent force, despite the finding on immunity.
In keeping with this Article's focus on civil recourse theory, the argument advanced
here-in favor of nominal damages even if officials have immunity-stresses the vindication
goal of constitutional tort. For a different kind of argument in favor of nominal damages in
this context, focusing on deterrence rather than civil recourse, see Pfander, supra note 52.
190 See supra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Part IV.c.1.
192 See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2044 ("[Clonstitutional plaintiffs may seek declaratory or
injunctive relief pursuant to standard principles of justiciability.").
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immunity. In any event, the Court should address that question
on its own merits. It should not conflate vindication and loss
allocation by treating "liability for substantial compensatory
damages"193 as the cost of the litigation when the less restrictive
alternative of allowing nominal recoveries may provide for
vindication without seriously deterring worthy official behavior at
all.
Under current law, officials are entitled to absolute immunity
from liability for damages when they act in a judicial,
prosecutorial, or legislative function. 94  Absolute immunity
protects such officials even if they violate clearly established law
and act maliciously to deliberately harm the plaintiff. Why should
the policies that drive these immunities bite so hard that they
foreclose even a recovery of nominal damages in the most
egregious cases? Apart from legislators,195 these officials may be
held liable for prospective relief under current law, 196 so it does not
appear that adding vulnerability to nominal damages would
significantly affect their willingness to act in ways that could lead
to non-compensatory liability. Only if there are reasons not yet
articulated in the case law should these officials be spared
absolutely from suits seeking to vindicate constitutional rights by
imposing mere nominal damages. One such reason may be the
availability of attorney's fees for a prevailing plaintiff. Arguably,
the threat of such a fee award will deter the officer in the same
way, if not to the same extent, as the threat of compensatory
liability on the merits. If that is so, the problem can be addressed
without barring relief altogether by a rule that precludes fee
awards against officials who have immunity from compensatory
damages. Another concern is that the costs of defending the suit,
193 Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep't, 933 F. Supp. 396, 426 (D. N.J. 1996), aff'd, 174 F.3d 95
(3d Cir. 1999).
154 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
195 Current law protects legislators from both prospective and retrospective remedies.
See Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-34 (1980)
(discussing precedent that held legislators immune from liability for damages and
prospective relief).
196 See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (judges are not immune from
prospective relief); see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING
THE CONSTITUTION 94-97 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the distinction, drawn by the Court's
immunity rulings, between retrospective and prospective relief).
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even for just nominal damages, will inhibit these officials. If this
is a sufficiently serious concern, perhaps it should override the
plaintiffs interest in vindication. In evaluating the strength of
this defense-costs argument, however, it is important to note that
the governmental unit may well pay them.
2. The Order of Battle. Even if there are strong grounds for
denying nominal damages when defendants are able to
successfully assert absolute or qualified immunity, Courts still
may further the civil recourse values of redress and vindication by
making a more subtle change in current doctrine. In any
immunity case, there are two issues: (1) whether the defendant
violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights and (2) if so, whether
the defendant is nonetheless entitled to immunity. Pearson v.
Callahan addressed the order in which these two questions should
be decided.197 Before Pearson the Court, in Saucier v. Katz, had
directed lower courts first to decide whether a constitutional tort
had occurred. 98 Pearson changed course, holding that "[t]he
judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be
permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case
at hand."199 After Pearson, a court still might start with the
constitutional side of the case and reach the immunity defense
only after finding for the plaintiff on the constitutional merits. 200
But now the court may elect to assume, without deciding, that the
plaintiff prevails on the constitutional issue, address the immunity
197 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009) (holding the mandated order from prior cases "should not be
regarded as an inflexible requirement"). For a pre-Pearson analysis of the issue, arguing
against the view the Court took in that case, see Michael L. Wells, The "Order-of-Battle" in
Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1539, 1543 (2007). For post-Pearson assessments
of the Court's approach, see Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional
Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 163-75, and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of
Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 117-31.
198 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (mandating this approach).
119 555 U.S. at 236.
200 See Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir.
2011) (noting that the order of analysis is within the court's discretion); see, e.g., Moore v.
City of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2011) (treating the constitutional issue first);
Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648
F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (same).
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issue first, and rule for the defendant without ever resolving the
constitutional question. 201
Pearson may promote efficient judicial administration because
the Saucier "procedure sometimes results in a substantial
expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that
have no effect on the outcome of the case."202 But more is at stake
in these cases than judicial time and government dollars. To the
extent lower courts take advantage of the opportunity Pearson
offers them to avoid constitutional questions, the effect of this rule
is to deny deserving plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain any
vindication at all, even a mere public declaration that they
suffered a constitutional wrong. In addition to blocking even
nominal damages for specific plaintiffs, Pearson will slow down, in
a systematic way, the clear articulation of substantive
constitutional norms. Rights that cannot be asserted either
defensively or in suits for prospective relief will remain
undefined.203 To the extent those rights are inchoate, defendants
will successfully assert immunity time and again, frustrating the
plaintiffs interest in recourse. 204 Vindication of rights would be
better served by greater clarity as to the constitutional rights
persons hold, not less. To be sure, constitutional avoidance may
retard the growth of doctrines that restrict constitutional rights.
The development of such doctrines cannot be seen as frustrating
the vindication of rights, however, because the very point of these
doctrines is to reveal when there are no rights to vindicate at all.20 5
201 See, e.g., James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling for
defendants on immunity without deciding whether they committed a constitutional
violation); PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1197 (10th Cir. 2010) (same).
Sometimes the judges on a panel disagree as to which issue they should address first. In
Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010), for example, the majority chose to
dispose of the case on qualified immunity grounds without reaching the First Amendment
issue. The dissent, however, would have decided the constitutional issue first. Id. at 1171
(Holloway, J., dissenting).
202 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37.
203 See Jeffries, supra note 197, at 132-36 (pointing out that "[tihe real problem with
Pearson ... is that constitutional tort actions are sometimes primary").
204 See Wells, supra note 197, at 1558-65 (discussing tensions between the avoidance
policy and the aims of constitutional tort).
205 An interesting empirical study "provides evidence that while a mandatory sequencing
regime [i.e., requiring courts to resolve the constitutional issue first] may disadvantage
plaintiffs bringing § 1983 actions, it may also have a rights-affirming effect for plaintiffs,
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VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
In enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976206 Congress sought to encourage lawyers to take cases
brought under § 1983 and similar statutes to enforce
constitutional rights.207 The Act authorizes the court to award
attorney's fees to a "prevailing party" as part of the costs. 208
Courts ordinarily calculate the fee by determining "the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate."209 Courts may modify this figure, called
the "lodestar," depending on the "results obtained" in the case. 210
In determining the degree of success, one factor is the amount of
damages obtained.211 A plaintiff who succeeds only on some claims
will receive a lower fee award unless the claims are so interrelated
that time spent on one theory cannot be separated from time spent
on another.212 The statute authorizes fee awards to plaintiffs who
obtain prospective relief as well.213
thereby benefiting potential future plaintiffs bringing similar § 1983 claims." Greg Sobolski
& Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions
and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 526-27 (2010).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
207 See THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 94-1011, at
2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1908, 5910 (noting that "fee awards have proved
an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the
important Congressional policies which these laws contain").
28 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The statute reads, in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding
to enforce [§ 1983], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ." Id. The Court reads
the statute as permitting an award to a victorious defendant "only where the suit was
vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant." Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983); see, e.g., Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2217 (2011)
(noting that where an attorney's work is necessary for both frivolous and related, non-
frivolous claims, attorney's fees should not be awarded for the overlapping work).
m Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801 (2002)
(explaining that since Hensley, "[t]he 'lodestar' figure has, as its name suggests, become the
guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence" (quoting Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557,
562 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
210 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
211 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-16 (1992) (limiting attorney's fees for prevailing
party who only recovered nominal damages).
212 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35.
213 See NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 709.
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By defining success in terms of dollars won, the Court seems to
have rejected civil recourse principles, which would measure
success by whether the plaintiff obtained redress for the
constitutional wrong. Farrar v. Hobby214 illustrates the problem.
There, the plaintiff obtained a finding that the defendant had
violated his constitutional rights, but he received only nominal
damages. 215 The Court held that the plaintiff was a prevailing
party within the terms of the statute, but also ruled that "[w]hen a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to
prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the
only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all."216 Some reasoning in
the opinion suggests that the Court believes that constitutional
tort suits mainly concern loss allocation. For example, the Court
cited Carey v. PiphuS 217 for the proposition that nominal damages
would be available absent proof of harm but then declared that
"[iln a civil rights suit for damages ... the awarding of nominal
damages also highlights the plaintiff's failure to prove actual,
compensable injury."218 One could infer from this language that
the absence of compensable loss undermines the plaintiff's claim to
a fee award, perhaps in every case.
In the years since Farrar, lower courts have divided on the
issue of whether attorney's fees are available for plaintiffs who
secure only nominal damages. 219 If and when the Supreme Court
addresses this question, civil recourse principles would weigh
heavily on the plaintiff's side. Farrar itself suggests that a
categorical reading of the case is mistaken. For example, a
plaintiff who from the outset seeks only nominal damages to
vindicate a right is not covered by the reasoning of Farrar, which
stresses the gap between the relief the plaintiff sought and that
obtained.220  In addition, the Court split 5-to-4, and Justice
214 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
215 Id. at 107.
216 Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
217 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
219 See NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 709-10 (citing cases on both sides of the issue).
For a recent illustration, see Guy v. City of San Diego, 608 F.3d 582, 588-90 (9th Cir. 2010)
(overturning district court's refusal to award a fee).
220 Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (noting that "[a] plaintiff who seeks compensatory damages but
receives no more than nominal damages ... should receive no attorney's fees at all").
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O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she
stressed that "an award of nominal damages can represent a
victory in the sense of vindicating rights even though no actual
damages are proved."221  The problem in Farrar is that the
plaintiff was unable to show a causal connection between the
defendants' violation of his due process rights and the $17 million
in business losses for which he sued.222 In these circumstances, it
seems appropriate to characterize his nominal damages award as
"technical" success. 223 According to civil recourse theory, however,
the point of the cause of action for many plaintiffs is to empower
them to seek redress, not to make them whole for harm suffered.
Plaintiffs who sue to vindicate their constitutional rights, win on
the constitutional claim, yet fail to persuade the jury of
compensatory damages may be more deserving of a fee award
under this theory.
On another point, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Farrar stands at odds with civil recourse theory. In particular she
suggested that in deciding on a fee award in a nominal damages
case, the court should consider "[t]he difference between the
amount recovered and the damages sought," "the significance of
the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed,"
and whether the plaintiff "accomplished some public goal."2 2 4 The
first of these considerations may have a bearing on whether
vindication was the point of the litigation, whether the plaintiff
genuinely succeeded, whether a fee award is appropriate, and the
proper size of the fee. Thus, failure to obtain a large award after
having sought one arguably suggests that simple vindication was
not the plaintiffs primary goal in bringing suit. The other two
factors stand on a different footing. Applying them, lower courts
have granted or denied fees based on considerations that shift
attention away from the plaintiffs success at redressing the
personal wrong-the goal of the suit under civil recourse theory. 225
221 Id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
222 Id. at 106.
223 Id. at 113-14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224 Id. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
225 See, e.g., Guy v. City of San Diego, 608 F.3d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that
although the plaintiff received only nominal damages, "we conclude that a fee award serves
a purpose beneficial to society by encouraging the City of San Diego to ensure that all of its
1046 [Vol. 46:1003
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Simply put, the value of the plaintiffs success to the public at
large has nothing to do with the nature and severity of the harm
suffered by the plaintiff.22 6 In the end, perhaps considerations
that focus on the public interest should control application of the
fee statute, but if so, that result should flow from principles of
statutory interpretation, including fidelity to Congress's
underlying purpose. And it should not be overlooked that basing
fees on public-oriented concerns is incompatible with the
distinctive vision of civil recourse theory. To the extent that civil
recourse norms should govern fee awards for nominal damages, in
particular, the decisive factor is whether the plaintiff succeeded on
the plaintiffs terms, not whether the litigation produced benefits
for the public.
VII. OBJECTIONS
A. AN INAPPROPRIATE RESOURCE
A central principle of statutory interpretation is that courts
should follow the legislature's directives.227 Since § 1983 was
enacted by the Forty-Second Congress in 1871, it is quite
reasonable to question the legitimacy of using civil recourse, or
any other modern tort theory, to resolve cases arising under that
statute. Perhaps the only appropriate sources for interpreting the
statute are its language, its legislative history, and the common
law as it stood in 1871. Such a view of the statute presents an
array of problems, however.
police officers are well trained to avoid the use of excessive force"); Mahach-Watkins v.
Depee, 593 F.3d 1054, 1061-63 (9th Cir. 2010) (awarding a fee because the legal issue was
significant and accomplished a public goal).
226 Sometimes courts mention both the public benefit theme and the intangible nature of
the right vindicated by the litigation. See, e.g., Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch.
Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 765 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that "[p]laintiffs obtained an injunction that
benefitted all of the students in the school district, and the free speech right vindicated was
not readily reducible to a sum of money").
227 See WUllAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13 (1994)
(documenting the proposition that "[t]heories of statutory interpretation in the United
States have in this century emphasized the original meaning of statutes, and debates have
focused on identifying the best evidence of that original meaning').
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To begin with, if the Court limits itself in this way, it would be
entirely unable to resolve many important questions because the
statute is brief and sweeping, 228 the legislative history is mainly
concerned with other parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,229 and
the common law doctrine we now refer to as "torts" was in its
infancy. 230 As a result, "[t]he text and history of § 1983 cannot
themselves establish the boundaries of the statute's
enforcement."231 Even if the Court could discover sufficient
materials to work effectively with § 1983, constitutional torts law
has a broader reach. It includes suits against federal officers
under the federal common law cause of action recognized in
Bivens232 to which the statute is inapplicable.
For present purposes, a sufficient answer to this unauthorized
source objection to using civil recourse theory is that the Supreme
Court pays little attention to the argument that § 1983's text and
background are the only appropriate sources for adjudicating
constitutional tort issues. Although a few of the Court's opinions
do rely on 1871 materials, many others do not.233  Thus,
throughout the history of constitutional tort litigation, the Court
routinely has resorted to principles, policies, and theories that
228 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
229 See Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory
Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 65-68 (1986) (discussing the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871). The statute was aimed at suppressing
Ku Klux Klan terrorism in the South after the Civil War by means of criminal penalties, by
authorizing the President to suspend habeas corpus and send troops to quell disturbances,
and by authorizing the now § 1983 private cause of action. Most of the debate concerned
the general issue of whether the statute was needed. As for the particulars of the statute,
there was more debate concerning whether the President should be authorized to send
troops than about the private remedy. Id.
230 Holmes's essays written in the 1870s have been described as "the first serious attempt in
the common law world to give torts both a coherent structure and a distinctive substantive
domain." Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1232, 1256 (2001).
231 Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 54 (1989).
232 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) ("Having concluded that petitioner's complaint states a cause of action under the
Fourteenth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for
any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment." (internal
citations omitted)).
233 Thus, the key ruling on qualified immunity, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982),
does not rely at all on historical arguments. See also JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 196, at
186-88 (questioning whether the Court's use of history actually accounts for its holdings).
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were not available to the Forty-Second Congress. Civil recourse
theory stands on the same footing as this array of post-1871
materials. In fact, if civil recourse theory were rejected simply on
the basis of its modernity, then most of the Court's constitutional
tort doctrine would have to go with it.
In Owen v. City of Independence, for example, Justice Brennan
examined the history of municipal immunity234 but went on to
discuss "considerations of public policy."235 The official immunity
decisions give a tip of the hat to history,236 but the most important
decision of all, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, abandons historical analysis
altogether in favor of relying on policy considerations. 23 7 Notably,
Harlow was a Bivens case in which the Court opted for a uniform
rule for all constitutional tort cases regarding official immunity.238
Uniformity could be achieved only by dropping the pretense that
§ 1983 cases were to be adjudicated only by implementing 1871
legislative intent, rather than through tort policy as utilized in
Bivens.
The Court's treatment of collateral estoppel in § 1983 cases is
part and parcel of this same story. In 1871, that doctrine applied
only in cases of "mutuality," so a party would be estopped from
relitigating an issue in a later case only if the party asserting
estoppel also would be bound by the earlier ruling.239 In Allen v.
McCurry, however, the Court rejected the mutuality requirement
in § 1983 litigation in favor of the modern doctrine, which rejects
this strict limit on collateral estoppel.240 Put bluntly, the Court
rejected the rule the Forty-Second Congress would have presumed
234 445 U.S. 622, 638-50 (1980).
235 Id. at 650.
236 See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-22 (1984) (considering the history of
§ 1983); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (citing history); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (citing centuries-old case law); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 372-76 (1951) (same).
237 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982) (conducting policy-based inquiry balancing competing
values); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (describing the "functional
approach" the Court uses to decide immunity questions).
238 457 U.S. at 818 n.30.
239 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335 (1979) (noting that at common
law, collateral estoppel only applied when mutuality existed).
240 449 U.S. 90, 97 (1980). The Court noted that "the requirement of mutuality of estoppel
was still alive in the federal courts until well into this century," indicating the Court's
modern rejection of it. Id.
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to be applicable in favor of a doctrine shown to be more sensible in
ensuing years.241
A realistic account of the Court's methodology in developing
constitutional tort law would acknowledge that the Court has
employed a variety of methods and materials. Sometimes the
Court does approach § 1983 cases with a focus on traditional
methods of statutory interpretation. In Monell v. Department of
Social Services, for example, the Court based its ruling against
municipal vicarious liability solely on its analysis of § 1983's
legislative history.242 Sometimes the Court actually has looked to
the tort law as it stood in 1871.243 Other cases, however, borrow
directly from modern tort law, as Carey did in adopting "the
compensation principle." 244 The Court's immunity cases often rely
on modern tort policy, 245 attempting to balance the constitutional
values served by imposing liability with the constraints on liability
necessary to assure effective government.246 Taken as a whole, the
Court's § 1983 case law suggests that it sometimes takes due
account of the background and aims of the statute but that it
also-and often-considers other factors as well.24 7 Whatever the
241 Id. at 97-101; see also id. at 114 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Forty-
Second Congress would not have approved of the modern rule).
242 436 U.S. 658, 691-92, 692 n.57 (1978). Critics of Monell charge that the Court misread
the legislative history. Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011); see, e.g.,
David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2196 (2005)
("The Court's conclusions rest on historically inaccurate assumptions about the nineteenth-
century justifications for respondeat superior."); Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal
Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 250 (1987)
('The Monell Court read the language and history of § 1983 erroneously.").
243 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 3, 34 (1983) ("In the absence of more specific
guidance, we looked first to the common law of torts (both modern and as of 1871) .... );
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638-50 (1980) (finding insufficient evidence of
municipal immunity at common law to warrant § 1983 municipal immunity).
2 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978). The Court noted that the Forty-Second
Congress did not directly address the issue of damages but recognized that the
compensation principle dominates modern lower courts. Id.
24 See, e.g., Owen, 445 U.S. at 650-56 (discussing "considerations of public policy" that
count against municipal immunity).
246 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982) (stating that "[tihe
resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable
in any available alternative").
247 Commentators across the ideological spectrum agree that the Court does, and should,
exercise a creative function in addressing constitutional tort issues. See, e.g., Paul M.
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shortcomings of this approach, it also has its merits, including
pragmatic adaptation of the doctrine in light of changed conditions
and openness to new insights. New ideas always have been
welcome in constitutional tort law, and the ideas behind civil
recourse theory should be no exception to the extent they reflect
important values.
B. AN INADEQUATE REMEDY
A different objection to drawing on civil recourse norms in
constitutional tort law is that attentiveness to those norms would
result in insufficient protection for constitutional rights.
Constitutional tort law is a crucial element in our three-pronged
system of remedies for constitutional violations. Besides these tort
suits, only two other remedies may be available depending on the
circumstances. First, the Constitution may serve as a shield
against an enforcement action brought against the holder of the
right. Persons who are charged with crimes or named as
defendants in civil cases, for example, may assert constitutional
rights as defenses. Criminal defendants charged with subversive
advocacy and civil defendants sued for defamation possess well-
recognized defenses based on the First Amendment. The second
mechanism is prospective relief. Persons who are subject to
ongoing or threatened future constitutional violations may seek
injunctions or declaratory judgments. Constitutionally dubious
statutes or ongoing practices like a school district's restrictions on
student speech 248 may be challenged in this way.
Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605,
622 n.49 (1981) (explaining that the Supreme Court has held that "the post-Civil War
jurisdictional and remedial statutes .. . leav[e] much to interpretation in light of contexts
and postulates not always visible on their surface"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values
in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1051-54 (1989) (noting how "the old
meta-rule [of statutory interpretation] has lost much of its force, but the common law
exercises a substantial influence on statutory interpretation in other ways"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405, 421 (1989)
(stating that sometimes "the words [of statutes] necessarily require courts to look to sources
outside of the text").
248 See, e.g., Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 762-63 (8th
Cir. 2008) (affirming district court holding "permanently enjoining defendants from
disciplining any student for wearing a band substantially similar to those worn by plaintiffs
in this case").
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The value of constitutional torts as part of the tripartite system
of constitutional remedies is that, in some fact patterns, neither of
these other remedies is available and constitutional wrongs will go
unaddressed in the absence of tort relief. These are situations in
which the constitutional violation occurred in the past and
recurrence is unlikely, such as when the police have broken up a
particular peaceful demonstration, a government agency has fired
a particular person for protected speech, or prison guards have
mistreated a particular inmate. In each of these cases, there is no
enforcement proceeding against the right holder, so the right may
not be raised defensively. Prospective relief is also unavailable
because the violation occurred in the past and is unlikely to recur,
so the forward-looking equitable relief makes no sense and indeed
would offend the jurisdictional restraints imposed by the
Constitution. 249 As a result, in these situations the only means
available for vindicating constitutional rights is a constitutional
tort suit. Because the real-world value of a right depends on the
remedies available for it,250 constitutional torts thus can be seen as
every bit as essential to the system of constitutional remedies as
constitutional defenses and suits for prospective relief.
The problem with current constitutional tort law is that the
retrospective remedy is systematically less effective than either of
its partner remedies. When the putative right-holder is the
defendant in an enforcement proceeding, ordinarily there will be
no obstacle to raising the right defensively. When the challenged
action is ongoing or threatens to recur, the putative right-holder
ordinarily will have easy access to injunctive or declaratory relief,
so long as the plaintiff can satisfy the Court's requirements of
standing, ripeness, and lack of mootness. Though plaintiffs whose
claims require resort to a constitutional tort suit will have no
difficulty with those requirements, they still may lose, despite the
soundness of their claims, because of official immunity, lack of
vicarious liability, or difficulties in proving damages or causation.
249 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (holding that plaintiff was not
entitled to an injunction "[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a
similar way").
250 See Levinson, supra note 159, at 887 (noting that "the cash value of a right is often
nothing more than what the courts . . . will do if the right is violated").
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The resulting danger is a general under-enforcement of those
constitutional norms that typically depend on tort suits for
enforcement. 251
Civil recourse theory does not fully solve this problem and in
some ways exacerbates it. For example, a central feature of civil
recourse theory is to leave crucial decisions in the hands of the
aggrieved person. The tort system empowers the plaintiff to seek
redress. 252 To the extent plaintiffs are unable or unwilling to do
so, officials who violate constitutional rights will face no
consequences.253 In addition, official immunities remain a hurdle
under a civil recourse approach. By focusing on empowering the
victim, civil recourse theory casts doubt on the current practice of
allowing suits by survivors of victims who have died in the interval
since the constitutional violation, at least where the death is
unrelated to that breach.254 On the other hand, civil recourse
theory favors presumed damages. 255 In addition, more plaintiffs
would have access to nominal damages if, in accordance with civil
recourse norms, the causation and immunity doctrines only
blocked recovery of substantial damages. 256
Given this mixed picture, it is unclear whether a civil recourse
approach to constitutional torts is optimal from the perspective of
one bent on securing a robust panoply of constitutional remedies.
So how is civil recourse theory to be defended against the
251 See Jeffries, supra note 197, at 117 ("If, however, constitutional rights are to function
as operational limits on government rather than mere figures of rhetoric, there must be an
adequate structure of enforcement.").
252 See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV.
67, 99-100 (2010) (arguing that tort "empowers" victims); Solomon, supra note 2, at 1805,
1806 (discussing how tort law upholds the authority of the victim by giving her an
opportunity to hold the tortfeasor accountable).
253 For this reason, a civil recourse approach would rule out a private attorney general
theory of constitutional torts in which a litigant could bring a qui tam action, where the
victorious plaintiff obtains a bounty for bringing suit to enforce the law. In any event,
specific statutory authorization is required for such suits. See Evan Caminker, Comment,
The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 345-46 (1989) (describing two
doctrinal hurdles to qui tam actions, (1) the exclusive authority of the Executive Branch to
enforce public interests and (2) Article III's standing requirements).
254 For a collection of cases on this and other issues bearing on suits brought by persons
other than the direct victims of constitutional wrongs, see NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 6, at
581-92.
255 See supra Part IV.A.
256 See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
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underenforcement-based line of attack? The best defense is one of
confession and avoidance. The confession: civil recourse theory
only has these shortcomings in the eyes of those whose concerns
focus on avoiding underenforcement of constitutional rights.
Avoidance means that this supposed shortcoming must be situated
within the larger context of the law of constitutional remedies.
The ultimate goal of the three-pronged system-asserting rights
defensively, asserting them prospectively, and asserting them
retrospectively in suits for damages-is not to ensure that a
satisfactory remedy exists for every violation. Supreme Court
precedent simply does not support that proposition.2 7  The
availability of constitutional remedies is better understood as "a
principle, not an ironclad rule."258 A more realistic aim is to devise
"a general structure of constitutional remedies adequate to keep
government within the bounds of law."259 While the tripartite
structure of constitutional remedies is hardly perfect, it provides
an array of tools for achieving that aim.
This Article is concerned with the tort prong of this system, i.e.,
the rules governing backward-looking relief. The core argument
for following civil recourse theory in addressing these rules is that,
whatever its failings, the theory concentrates on the constitutional
dimension of the case. Thus, civil recourse consistently and
broadly favors at least some vindication of constitutional rights
and some redress of constitutional wrongs. By contrast, ordinary
tort law focuses on the allocation of losses that result from
constitutional violations. In focusing on loss rather than
vindication of rights, ordinary tort principles may well miss the
main point of constitutional tort law.
Attentiveness to civil recourse principles would help avert the
danger, already apparent in much of the case law, of assimilating
constitutional tort into ordinary tort law or other forms of
regulation. Of particular importance, during the past thirty years,
the Court has denied the Bivens cause of action to litigants who
2 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 87 (1999) (pointing out that "a right-remedy gap is probably inevitable in constitutional
law and is in any event deeply embedded in current doctrine").
258 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991).
259 Id. at 1736.
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could have pursued civil service remedies, 260 social security
remedies, 261 military justice remedies,262 remedies under the
Federal Tort Claims Act,263 or state tort remedies.264 In similar
fashion, on several occasions the Court has adverted to the
availability of state tort remedies in rejecting liability under
§ 1983.265 To the extent constitutional tort law resembles ordinary
tort or administrative regulation, as it does when it focuses on loss
allocation, the case for requiring resort to state tort law and other
non-constitutional remedies is comparatively strong. A civil
recourse approach, however, highlights the distinctive role of
redress in constitutional torts and therefore is better suited to
repel the tendency to erode constitutional rights in this way. If
judges and lawmakers are unconvinced of the benefits of loss
allocation in constitutional torts and find that civil recourse offers
a more appealing rationale for this type of litigation, they will be
less likely to curb the freestanding vibrancy of § 1983 and Bivens.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Civil recourse theory has much to offer constitutional tort law
by freeing it from the notion that the sole or main point of such
litigation is to make the plaintiff whole. These suits are brought to
260 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1983) (denying a Bivens cause of action to a
federal employee).
261 See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424-29 (1988) (concluding that a Bivens cause
of action was unavailable); see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549-62 (2007)
(considering other administrative remedies and denying Bivens claim).
262 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-304 (1983) ("[I]t would be inappropriate to
provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers.").
263 See Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1851, 1848 (2010) (preventing the litigant's
Bivens claim).
264 See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 73-74 (2001) ('The caution toward
extending Bivens remedies into any new context .. . forecloses such an extension here."); see
also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying the "alternative
remedies" principle to deny Bivens claim).
265 Admittedly, the principal cases are old, but they still are viable precedents. See
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (stating that state remedies may provide all
the process that is due in connection with a deprivation of property); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 674-82 (1977) (noting that the availability of a state tort remedy provides
sufficient process in connection with corporal punishment); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
711-12 (1976) (rejecting plaintiff's attempt to bring a constitutional tort suit for defamation
and leaving the matter to state tort law).
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redress constitutional wrongs. Civil recourse thinking puts rights,
wrongs, and vindication at the core of the litigation and furnishes
a normatively attractive set of principles for resolving the remedial
issues raised in § 1983 and Bivens cases. The Supreme Court has
not paid heed to this basic point. Rather, it typically has acted on
the unexamined and dubious premise that constitutional torts
should reflect the main currents of modern tort law, an area
dominated by the general theme of allocating losses. Rather than
thinking carefully about the distinctive features of constitutional
torts, the Justices-and indeed many of their critics-have drawn
superficially appealing, but fundamentally mistaken, analogies to
the general principles of modern negligence law, under which
there is no liability without loss.
Professor Cass Sunstein once observed that "[r]easoning by
analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning."266 In view of
the striking similarities between constitutional torts and common
law torts, it is understandable that the Court has looked to the
common law for solutions to constitutional tort issues. Arguments
by analogy appeal to judges for a variety of reasons. Borrowing old
solutions for kindred problems saves time and effort. Fairness,
prudence, and stability favor resorting to established rules
developed in one context to deal with ostensibly similar situations.
Judges follow the doctrine of precedent all the time, and
arguments by analogy resemble (and are themselves analogous to)
arguments from precedent.
The familiarity of an argument, however, is not an indication of
its force. In law as elsewhere, the strength of an argument by
analogy depends on whether the two things analogized are
sufficiently similar to justify treating them the same.26 7 As Judge
Posner notes in his critique of analogical reasoning, "what is really
involved is querying (or quarrying) the earlier case for policies that
may be applicable to the later one."268 Is constitutional tort law
sufficiently akin to ordinary tort law, and particularly to ordinary
266 Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741
(1993).
267 See id. at 745 (explaining that the force of an argument from analogy depends on
whether "A and B are 'relevantly' similar, and that there are not 'relevant' differences
between them").
268 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 518 (1995).
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negligence law, to validate the Court's arguments by analogy? The
answer emphatically is no. Constitutional torts protect a more
fundamental set of rights against a more powerful set of
defendants. Few of the policies that are relevant to the loss
allocation goals of modern tort theory have much bearing on
constitutional torts. Going forward, the Supreme Court should
respond to these realities. It should abandon the common law
analogies that have come to dominate § 1983 cases and the Bivens
doctrine and rebuild the intellectual structure of constitutional
tort doctrine from the ground up. Hopefully, this Article has
shown some ways in which civil recourse theory can contribute to
that project.
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